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Abstract
Enforcing data protection and privacy rules within large
data processing applications is becoming increasingly im-
portant, especially in the light of GDPR and similar reg-
ulatory frameworks. Most modern data processing hap-
pens on top of a distributed storage layer, and securing
this layer against accidental or malicious misuse is crucial
to ensuring global privacy guarantees. However, the per-
formance overhead and the additional complexity for this
is often assumed to be significant – in this work we de-
scribe a path forward that tackles both challenges. We
propose “Software-Defined Data Protection” (SDP), an
adoption of the “Software-Defined Storage” approach to
non-performance aspects: a trusted controller translates
company and application-specific policies to a set of rules
deployed on the storage nodes. These, in turn, apply the
rules at line-rate but do not take any decisions on their
own. Such an approach decouples often changing policies
from request-level enforcement and allows storage nodes
to implement the latter more efficiently.
Even though in-storage processing brings challenges,
mainly because it can jeopardize line-rate processing, we
argue that today’s Smart Storage solutions can already
implement the required functionality, thanks to the sep-
aration of concerns introduced by SDP. We highlight the
challenges that remain, especially that of trusting the stor-
age nodes. These need to be tackled before we can reach
widespread adoption in cloud environments.
1 Introduction
Our online presence has been generating unprecedented
amounts of data, a large portion of which are personally
identifiable and hence prone to misuse. Even though com-
panies have long used different access control and en-
cryption techniques to secure the information they col-
lect, with the emergence of regulatory frameworks such
as GDPR in the EU [10] and CCPA in California [6],
there is a need to homogenize and perhaps standardize
these techniques to enforce rules at all levels of appli-
cation stacks [38, 34]. In this work, we focus on en-
forcing privacy rules at the storage level, but tracking
data through processing steps of large-scale applications
or when shared with third parties, is just as important.
Nonetheless, analysis of GDPR finds that more than 30%
of the articles enforcing data protection are related to stor-
age [36]. Maintaining strict compliance is challenging be-
cause it requires computational resources beyond the ca-
pacity of storage nodes and could slow down data access.
There have been two emerging trends that bring an op-
timistic outlook to enforcing privacy rules directly in the
storage layer. First, disaggregated architectures in the
cloud and datacenters are increasingly offering some form
of in-storage processing [33, 8] and flexible data man-
agement [17, 13] with high-speed network connectivity.
Second, as an effort to keep the management, configura-
tion and monitoring of a large number of storage nodes
scalable, Software-Defined Storage (SDS) has been pro-
posed [39] – albeit the goal of existing SDS systems is al-
most exclusively to guarantee performance isolation and
service levels in distributed multi-tenant settings [27].
In this vision paper, we propose Software-Defined Data
Protection (SDP) that decouples policy interpretation and
decision making (control plane) from request processing
(data plane), reducing the complexity of the functional-
ity required inside the storage nodes that often have lim-
ited hardware resources. As a result, SDP makes it feasi-
ble to implement complex policies, such as GDPR, with
state-of-the-art smart storage devices that incorporate sev-
eral low-power CPU cores and programmable fabric (FP-
GAs) [33]. Furthermore, the logically centralized control
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plane ensures that regardless of the physical location of
the storage nodes, the same privacy rules apply, keeping
behavior consistent even across datacenters.
Somewhat surprisingly, when adopting the SDP ap-
proach, GDPR-compliant storage, to a large extent, can
be already provided with existing “building blocks”. We
sketch how these could assemble into a high bandwidth
pipeline within the storage node. We also highlight
the most important remaining challenge in the cloud
context, namely adding Trusted Execution Environments
(TEEs) [15] inside the storage nodes that would allow for
remote attestation of the firmware by the controller.
To summarize, our vision is that using in-storage com-
putation together with a control-plane/data-plane
separation will allow enforcing GDPR at line-rate,
without requiring storage nodes to be implemented with
large, power-hungry, servers. The proposed Software-
Defined Data Protection (SDP) can achieve this goal by
re-purposing hardware building blocks that have been
extensively studied in different contexts, and through
this, bring GDPR-compliance to storage at little added
cost. By sketching how a working solution would look
like, we identify the one missing piece in the state-of-
the-art needed to make our vision reality: the pos-
sibility of using Trusted Execution Environments in-
side storage nodes with heterogeneous hardware and
near-data processing.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Implications of GDPR in the Cloud and
on Storage
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) outlines
the rights and responsibilities of the companies handling
the personal data of EU citizens. GDPR, in 99 articles
and 173 recitals, regulates the entire life cycle of personal
data, from its collection to its deletion.
GDPR outlines that it is the responsibility of a com-
pany to use third-party services that do not violate GDPR
standards. A vast majority of companies today rely on
cloud services providers, for their infrastructural needs,
making GDPR compliance in cloud environments a ne-
cessity. Therefore, rich related work proposes frameworks
enabling cloud users to develop GDPR-compliant appli-
cations [32], along with studies that outline the challenges
faced by cloud users in the face of GDPR [9], and the sup-
port for the right to be forgotten in hybrid clouds [18].
The impact of GDPR on storage systems [36] has
been broadly studied previously. GDPR’s impact on
databases [37] and how databases, by design, can comply
with GDPR [34, 22] are also analyzed. Recent work in-
vestigates how systems can violate GDPR [38], proposes
benchmarks [37] and provides tools [26] that test GDPR-
compliance, and that explore the benefits of Trusted hard-
ware to prove GDPR-compliance [28].
The six features required from a GDPR-compliant stor-
age system [36] are as follows:
1. Deletion. GDPR introduces the right to be forgotten,
allowing users to demand the deletion of personal data.
GDPR also states that personal data cannot be stored be-
yond its purpose in its storage limitation clause, requiring
storage systems to support user data deletion.
2. Logging and Monitoring. With GDPR, companies
are vested with the responsibility of detecting potential
data breaches, informing users about those data breaches,
and proving their compliance. GDPR also provides users
with the right to access, allowing them to request with
whom and why their personal data is shared. These rights
and requirements necessitate some form of logging and
monitoring at the storage layer.
3. Metadata and Secondary Indexes.As GDPR requires
personal data to be associated with a specific purpose,
storage has to accomodate for additional metadata. As
a performance optimization, secondary indexes that cate-
gorize data as per purposes can be useful.
4. Fine-grained Permissions. With GDPR’s right to
object, users can object to using their personal data for
specific purposes. Further, with the purpose limitation
clause, GDPR disallows companies to process user’s data
beyond its purpose and without appropriate security mea-
sures. To comply with these clauses, fine-grained permis-
sion checks and access control becomes crucial at the stor-
age layer.
5. Encryption. GDPR mandates that personal data
should be protected against accidental loss or damage and
should be incomprehensible to any person unauthorized to
access it. Encrypting personal data is a suitable measure
to comply with this clause.
6. Location Control. GDPR requires companies to ad-
here to its standards, independent of the geographical lo-
cation of where personal data is stored.
7. Data Integrity. We further identify that GDPR re-
quires storage systems to resist or detect malicious activ-
ities that compromise the integrity and confidentiality of
personal data. We propose using checksums or Merkle
tree-based data integrity checks to comply with the in-
tegrity and confidentiality clause of GDPR.
2.2 Emerging Smart Storage Devices.
Two kinds of smart storage devices are developed re-
cently: those which incorporate small CPU cores, such as
ARM cores [16, 20], and those which deploy specialized
compute elements or FPGAs [17, 13, 33, 3]. The former
category offers more flexibility, but as explored in depth
in the work of Koo et al. [20], it can be difficult to predict
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Figure 1: Emerging Smart Storage solutions incorporate
both ARM cores and Programmable Logic (FPGAs) of-
fering both flexibility and predictable performance.
the performance of the in-storage computation, and this
can lead to performance degradation. Those solutions that
rely on FPGAs and similar specialized hardware are a bet-
ter match for network-focused implementations because
they can guarantee network line-rate processing by de-
sign. To sample from our previous work, we have shown,
among other operations, that it is possible to implement
line-rate hash-tables [13], deduplication schemes [23], in-
storage filtering with regular expressions [12] on FPGA-
based distributed storage. These operations are similar in
nature to those required for building an SDP system (dis-
cussed in Section 3.1).
Overall, the SDP approach is beneficial in both cases
because it reduces the complexity of the code running
inside the storage nodes and allows developers to think
of the enforcement as pipeline stages. We sketch our
proposal targeting hardware platforms with a combina-
tion of ARM cored and FPGA fabric (as depicted in
Figure 1), such as the Fidus Sidewinder-100 [3] or the
Samsung SmartSSD [33, 7]. The presence of both a
general-purpose, albeit low power, CPU core, and a re-
programmable specialized hardware element ensures that
the devices can be managed easily in a cloud setting and,
at the same time, can deliver high-performance behavior
for privacy-related processing.
3 Software-Defined Data Protection
SDP targets cloud and datacenter use-cases where data is
being stored and processed within the context of a large
corporation with several applications but governed by a
single set of privacy rules. In line with DGPR require-
ments, we assume that user data can be identified explic-
itly through a universal user identifier and a purpose iden-
tifier. These identifiers are valid across applications of
the company, and the SDP controller has a global view
of which application can access what purposes. All users
within a purpose are accessible to the application, unless
consent has been revoked.
Figure 2 shows the three types of nodes in SDP: stor-
age, processing, and controller. Storage nodes imple-
ment a general-purpose key-value store (KVS) interface
Figure 2: We propose Software-Defined Data Protection
as a design approach to decouple policies from storage
node implementation.
on binary data, can be shared across applications, and
all communication with them happens over an encrypted
channel (e.g., TLS).
Applications run on one or several processing nodes
and are managed under the governance of the developers.
Applications have to register with the controller before ac-
cessing data but once granted access, can carry out most
of their operations with the storage nodes.
The controller node is logically centralized and is
trusted by both the storage and processing layers and is
controlled by the company’s data officers. It interprets
policies and maintains data mappings and is used to boot-
strap storage nodes, authenticate application nodes, and
manage their permissions. Storage nodes are trusted once
configured by the controller (see Section 4 for how this
could be ensured in practice in the cloud). As we explain
in the following subsections, once authenticated and con-
figured, in common case neither the application nor the
storage nodes have to communicate with the controller.
For this reason, we do not consider the controller as an
obvious bottleneck for performance.
3.1 Required Functionality
In Table 1, we summarize the GDPR articles relevant to
storage and what type of functionality is required for their
fulfillment. We also indicate for each aspect, whether the
SDP storage nodes (data plane) or the controller (control
plane) would bear most of the required complexity. Nat-
urally, even if the storage node performs almost all the
computation, for instance, as is the case with Encryption,
the controller will still have to bootstrap the nodes.
In the following, we discuss in more detail how the re-
quired functionalities can be implemented with state of
the art modules in hardware (FPGA) as part of an SDS-
inspired pipeline on the storage nodes. It is possible to
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No. GDPR article Required functionality Impacts mostly
5.1 Purpose limitation (data collected for specific purpose) Fine-grained permissions Storage, Controller
21 Right to object (data not used for objected reason) Fine-grained permissions Storage, Controller
5.1 Storage limitation (data not stored beyond purpose) Deletion Controller
17 Right to be forgotten Deletion Controller
15 Right of access by users Metadata (and Secondary indexes) Storage
20 Right to portability (transfer data on request) Metadata (and Secondary indexes) Storage
5.2 Accountability (ability to demonstrate compliance) Logging and Monitoring Storage, Controller
30 Records of processing activity Logging Storage
33, 34 Notify data breaches Logging and Monitoring Storage, Controller
25 Protection by design and by default Encryption Storage
32 Security of data Encryption and Access control Storage
13 Obtain user consent on data management High level policy† Controller
46 Transfers subject to safeguards Location control† Controller
Table 1: This table summarizes the GDPR articles relevant to storage and the high level functionality that the storage
nodes and SDP controller need to fulfill those. Functionality outside of the scope of this paper is marked with †.
implement most of the functionalities independent of each
other (Figure 3), and in future systems, non-performance-
critical steps could be moved to low power CPU cores (for
instance, Authentication that is only carried out once per
session), achieving this way heterogeneous processing.
Encryption. In the following, we sketch how encryp-
tion can be implemented inside the storage layer in a way
that a) relies on existing schemes and best practices and
b) makes it possible to map the key-management opera-
tions to the SDP scheme we propose.
Data needs to be encrypted both at rest and on the move.
We envision a system where clients (processing nodes)
receive plain-text tuples over encrypted channels. Block
ciphers underlying TLS have been shown to work well
on FPGAs [5, 11] reaching throughputs high enough to
saturate even 40Gbps links.
Persistent data on flash is always encrypted, assum-
ing industry-standard, symmetric-key cryptography (e.g.,
AES). The storage nodes must not persist cipher keys. In-
stead, they have to remain in memory and need to be con-
figured and managed by the SDP controller at run-time.
This forbids unauthorized access to the drives and pre-
vents leaks. One difference to traditional encrypted stor-
age is that in the GDPR context it can be beneficial if each
tuple is encrypted with a key specific to the user whose
data it represents (or even the user-purpose combination)
because, as later explained in the Deletion subsection, this
enables quick logical deletion of data.
A side-effect of having multiple (de)encryption keys is
that each client request will have to retrieve a different
one. Since requests encode user and purpose explicitly,
the storage node can use this to lookup the cipher key in an
internal ephemeral cipher key table (KT). It is important
that this table can sustain high access rates because, in
contrast to other meta-data structures described later, this
one has to be accessed on every incoming client request.
Figure 3: SDP enables separation of concerns, and as
a result, policy enforcement can be laid out as pipeline
within the storage nodes. The SDP controller configures
and manages the nodes from the outside.
One challenge of creating fast hash tables on special-
ized hardware is that it is unlikely that cipher keys will fit
on on-chip SRAM memory and will have to spill into off-
chip DRAM. There is recent work in the context of high-
performance key-value stores built on FPGAs [13, 25] us-
ing DRAM, which can be adequate for this purpose.
Fine-grained Permissions. Beyond the question of how
clients can reach storage devices (solved by SDS), an au-
thentication step is necessary. Authentication matches a
client’s identity to a set of permissions (read/write/insert
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rights per purpose). To carry out authentication, an Au-
thentication Table (AT) holds the public keys belonging to
applications. A Permission Table (PT) stores the mapping
of identities to permissions. Both tables are ephemeral
and are populated and managed by the controller. In most
workloads, the number of purposes (e.g., number of inter-
nal applications) will be orders of magnitude smaller than
that of individual users. Therefore the PT can be repre-
sented compactly, perhaps even on on-chip caches.
Permissions in the PT are orthogonal to the pres-
ence/absence of cipher keys in the KT: even if a client
has the right to read all key-value pairs belonging to a
purpose, only those for which the storage device holds
a cipher key in the KT can be successfully read. The
same holds for inserting tuple belonging to a new user or
purpose. The SDP controller has to first insert the corre-
sponding entries in the KT. It is important to note that per-
missions in themselves do not forbid applications to, for
instance, make copies of data under bogus user keys. For
this reason, end-to-end information tracking is required,
as we highlight this in Section 4.
Metadata and Indexing. By GDPR regulations it has
to be possible to retrieve all tuples belonging to a specific
user or purpose. This can be achieved by relying on meta-
data stored with the key-value pairs (and by enforcing a
naming scheme of tuples).
While not strictly necessary, if such reads will occur of-
ten, it can be beneficial to maintain secondary indexes for
performance reasons. Even though write operations will
become more expensive, these data structures can be used
to avoid scanning TBs of data to find a specific user’s en-
tries. For this purpose, there are already FPGA-based key-
value stores with low cardinality secondary index [13] and
by using the same hash table approach as for permissions,
etc., higher cardinality cases could be also handled.
Logging and Monitoring. Logging is important for en-
suring auditability of the storage layer and can be imple-
mented at various granularities. The storage node will
persist an encrypted log (the key for the log is configured
at run-time by the SDP controller) and implement some
form of integrity check at the tuple level. While we fore-
see no challenges with the former task, the latter might
require further investigation. Increasing the efficiency of
data structures that ensure the integrity storage are still a
topic in exploration [31, 30, 2].
For monitoring, the storage node has to notify the SDP
controller of any request that failed any of the valida-
tion steps outlined above or has retrieved a key-value
pair whose decryption key is missing. These events al-
low the controller to take adequate action, rectifying mis-
configuration, revoking permissions, etc.
Deletion. In this work we focus on logical deletion of user
data, since physically destroying all copies, and proving
this to a third party, is orthogonal to our goals and a chal-
lenge in itself [29, 19]. If using an encryption scheme with
a single key, the SDP controller can delete tuples belong-
ing to a user and purpose by delegating this task to the
storage device that will either scan the tuple space or use
a secondary index. But in case an encryption scheme with
multiple keys is used, deletion can be performed more
efficiently by simply removing the corresponding cypher
keys from the KT of the storage nodes. As a result, deleted
tuples will not be accessible any more as plain-text, and
without the cipher keys, cannot be decrypted. This ap-
proach is in-line with existing practices [4, 42].
Depending on the encryption scheme chosen, the logi-
cal delete operation could be performed with a single re-
quest to the storage node or in linear time. If (1) the en-
cryption of tuples is only based on the user they belong to,
then the controller can remove all tuples of a user in con-
stant time but will have to rely on secondary indexes to
physically remove all tuples belonging to a purpose. As
an alternative, (2) distinct cypher keys can be generated
for each user:purpose pair. This allows more fine-grained
deletions and, even though not constant time, deleting all
data of a user is linear in the number of purposes. As a
third option, (3) it is also a possibility to derive cypher
keys on the fly from two separately stored parts for user
and purpose. This enables constant time deletions of ei-
ther all data of a user or all data belonging to a purpose,
but more fine-grained deletions require costly scans in the
storage. Regardless of the choice of the scheme, the func-
tionality on the storage nodes changes very little because
most of the complexity is handled by the controller.
3.2 Features and Questions out of Scope
Location: The mapping of user and purpose to the actual
storage devices is carried out by the controller following
either general purpose sharding strategies or depending
on the privacy policies at the high level. GDPR, however,
mandates that regardless of the physical location of data
belonging to a user, the same rules apply to it. The logi-
cally centralized nature of the SDP controller is essential
for ensuring rule consistency at scale.
High level policies: The question of how company- and
application-wide policies are written, managed and trans-
lated to SDP rules is out of the context of this paper. There
is rich related work [21, 40, 41, 35] which demonstrates
how to translate high level policies to compliant queries
in databases (or compliant accesses in data storage lay-
ers) and we believe that they could be layered on top of
SDP since our proposal envisions functionality which is a
superset of such proposals.
Fault Tolerance by Replication: For simplicity, in our
discussion we assumed that each piece of data resides in-
side a single storage node. In a real system, however,
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replication will be required to ensure fault tolerance. As
highlighted by the above two points, the task of setting up
and controlling replication is external to our proposal and
can be tackled by numerous existing schemes. Nonethe-
less, there is work on performing transparent, line-rate,
replication of the KVS running on the FPGAs [14] that
could be easily adapted to be managed by the Controller.
Performance of the Controller: In our SDP vision, the
Controller is required to actively participate only in a sub-
set of operations. After carrying out initial authentications
and configuring encryption keys and permissions, it is sel-
dom accessed by either the processing nodes (application)
or the storage nodes. Once exception is when data belong-
ing to a new user or purpose is inserted for the first time.
Such operations, however, are less common than regular
reads and updates of existing data. Nonetheless, it is likely
that the Controller will have to be implemented as a log-
ically centralized by physically decentralized solution, to
be able to keep up with the workloads of large enterprises.
4 Future Challenges
In the previous section we described an SDS-inspired
design for smart storage nodes that could enforce pri-
vacy rules and make existing storage solutions GDPR-
compliant. There are, however, two challenges to be ad-
dressed before such a solution can be deployed in practice:
Trusted Execution Environments. There are several
trust-related challenges in the proposal we made above.
First of all, the security of the encrypted data at rest
hinges on the assumption that the storage device cannot
and will not leak cipher keys. Furthermore, the assump-
tion that all permissions are verified and honored cor-
rectly depend on whether the storage node is running the
expected software/firmware. For this reason, the Con-
troller has to be able to trust the storage node once it has
been powered on and “booted”. For this, we propose ex-
panding the storage node with a small Trusted Execution
Environment that can attest the correctness of the soft-
ware and hardware contents to the Controller.
Today, ARM processors can already offer guarantees
with the TrustZone extensions but emerging research
projects, such as Keystone [24], can implement TEEs
with custom hardware components. This approach fits
the use-case of SDP well, because a small RISC-V or
ARM core could be used to load the firmware on the stor-
age node that the controller provides. This firmware, in
turn, can be verified not to be able to read out cipher keys
to clients, etc. FPGAs have been also proposed to be
used as TEEs in project examples such as Cipherbase [1]
where they perform transaction processing in an always-
encrypted database management system.
Data Tracking Beyond Storage. While making sure
that the storage layer protects privacy and respects all
rules, data misuse can happen at other layers of the appli-
cation stack as well. There is no guarantee that a buggy
or malicious application does not store, for instance, data
belonging to one user under some other, potentially non-
existent, one’s data; or that results of processing do not
leak personally identifiable information to the outside
world. Countering such behavior has been the subject
of numerous studies in the context of Information Flow
Control, but practical, general purpose, solutions are still
not widely available. Even though the SDP approach
does not solve this challenge, we believe that at least it
makes it easier: On the one hand, removing all decision
making and policy interpretation from the storage nodes
and moving it into a logically centralized controller al-
lows for better overview of the system. Other monitoring
tools might be used to augment the monitoring capabil-
ity of the controller, achieving this way better coverage.
Furthermore, by not allowing storing new tuples into the
storage unless they belong to a user and purpose known
to the controller, some misuse scenarios can be limited
and be audited after the fact (identifying, for instance,
the application that created non-existent user IDs).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we painted our vision for a GDPR-compliant
storage solution that relies on a control path/data path sep-
aration to simplify the complexity of in-storage process-
ing necessary for enforcing privacy rules, and hence mak-
ing practical implementations possible. We call this ap-
proach Software-Defined Data Protection (SDP), inspired
by the Software-Defined Storage trend. Thanks to SDP,
implementing a processing pipeline in smart storage to
ensure complex privacy rules at high bandwidth is within
reach. As we sketch in this paper, such functionality
could indeed be provided by re-purposing existing build-
ing blocks. There are, however, open challenges to be
tackled. Importantly, SDP requires storage nodes to be
treated as a trusted cloud resource.
This paper is a call to arms for security and systems
researchers to join forces in making privacy protecting,
GDPR-compliant, distributed cloud storage a reality.
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